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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
990 BRADY AVENUE, LLC
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL GIDEWON, THE
GIDEWONS PROPERTY
HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No. 2016CV272538

ORDER ON DEFENDANT THE GIDEWONS PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.'S
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. 's
Motion to Dismiss, or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Upon consideration of the briefs
submitted on the Motion this Court finds as follows:
I. Undisputed Facts in the Pleadings
990 Brady Avenue, LLC ("990") leased a property located at 990 Brady A venue (the
"Premises") to The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. ("Gidewons").
dated June 10,2009

The Lease Agreement

(the "Lease"), was for a term of27 months, ending September 30, 2011, and

included a right for Gidewons to purchase the Premises during the term of the Lease. The Lease
required Gidewons as Tenant to "maintain in good order and repair the Premises" at his expense
"throughout the initial term of this Lease, and any extension or renewal thereof." Further, the
Lease states:
9(a). Tenant shall not make any alterations, additions, or improvements to the
Premises without Landlord's prior written consent, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld, delayed, or conditioned. All approved alterations,
additions, and improvements will be accomplished in a good and workmanlike
manner, in conformity with all applicable laws and regulations ....
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9(b). Landlord may require Tenant to remove any alterations, additions or
improvements (whether or not made with Landlord's consent) at the termination
of this Lease and to restore the Premises to its prior condition, all at Tenant's
expense. All alterations, additions and improvements which Landlord has not
required Tenant to remove shall become Landlord's property and shall be
surrendered to Landlord upon the termination of this Lease ....
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Landlord shall give Tenant written notice, at time
of Landlord consent, if such requested alterations will be required to be removed
upon lease expiration."
Gidewons did not purchase the Premises during the term of its Lease or during any of the five
subsequent Lease Amendments extending the term of the Lease. The Fifth Lease Amendment
extended the term of the Lease to March 31, 2016. However, 990 and Gidewons entered into a
Termination Agreement on January 31,2016,
February 1,2016.

terminating the Lease Agreement effective

The Termination Agreement further states that, "except as provided herein,

upon execution of this Termination Agreement by the parties hereto, the Lease Agreement shall
be terminated and neither party shall have any further obligations or liability to the other
thereunder."

The Lease, the five subsequent Lease Amendments, and the Termination

Agreement are all Exhibits to the Verified Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief.
During the term of the Lease Agreement, Gidewons admits that (1) a building on the
Premises was removed and a new building constructed, (2) office space was built out in another
building on the Premises, and (3) both power lines and sewer lines were run from the Premises to
a neighboring property, 1008 Brady Avenue. The parties agree that Ronald Jacobs, 990's owner,
was aware of all of these construction projects.

I

990 filed suit against Gidewons alleging breach of contract and breach of good faith and
fair dealing, and seeking permanent injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and expenses of litigation.
990 seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to remove the purportedly illegally constructed
I 990 further alleges that the construction projects were undertaken without necessary City of Atlanta permits
despite assurances at the time of construction to Jacobs that the projects were in compliance with all applicable
codes and had the necessary permits. Gidewons denies these allegations.
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building, office space, and underground powerlines from the Premises pursuant to the terms of
the Lease. In response, Gidewons filed this Motion arguing that any liability for removal of
additions, alterations, and improvements from the Premises were released under the express
terms of the Termination Agreement.

II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the
framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a
grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion
to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to
be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding
such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.

Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2) (1997) (citations omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(b)(6).
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when undisputed facts in the pleadings entitle the
movant to judgment as a matter of law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c);

Rolling Pin Kitchen

Emporium, Inc. v. Kaas, 241 Ga. App. 577,577(2) (1999). "[A]U well-pleaded material [factual]
allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and all [factual] allegations of
the moving party which have been denied are taken as false." Id. (citing Morgan v. Wachovia

Bank, 237 Ga. App. 257, 258(2) (1999)). The Court may consider exhibits to the complaint or
answer. Lapolla Indus. Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256,258(2)

(2013) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis
The Court finds the language of the Termination Agreement unambiguously releases any
further obligations or liabilities that may have been owed by the parties under the Lease.
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"Ambiguity exists where the words used in the contract leave the intent of the parties in
question-i.e., that intent is uncertain, unclear, or is open to various interpretations."

Coleman v.

Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247,249(2) (2008) (citations omitted).
"Conversely, no ambiguity exists where, examining the contract as a whole and affording the
words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning, the contract is capable of only one
reasonable interpretation." Id. "The existence or nonexistence of ambiguity in a contract is a
question of law for the court." Id.
Here, the language of the Termination Agreement is clear-neither party shall have "any
further obligations or liability" under the Lease. There are no exclusions or exceptions listed.
The Complaint seeks to impose liability on Gidewons arising directly from its obligations under
the Lease. Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Gidewons is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings as a matter of law as the Termination Agreement unambiguously releases the parties
from any Lease obligations or liabilities.
990 argues the Court should convert this Motion to one for summary judgment and
consider parol evidence as to the parties' intent. 990 argues that evidence will establish that the
parties did not intend the language in the Termination Agreement to be a full release of any and
all claims arising under the Lease but rather intended only to say that Gidewons was under no
obligation to pay the last two months' rent? Generally, under Georgia law, "[t]he cardinal rule
of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties." See O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3. "The
language which the parties have used will be looked to for the purpose of finding that intention,
which, when it is once ascertained, will prevail over all other considerations, in determining the
21n support of this argument, 990 attaches the affidavits of Ronald Jacobs and Michael Gidewon, both of whom
state that their intent when signing the Termination Agreement was only to waive Gidewons' obligation to pay the
last month's rent. They argue that Gidewons' new owner, The Elle B. Group Properties, LLC, is attempting to
expand the scope of the intended release in order to escape liability. However, the COUlt need not consider this
extrinsic evidence as the language of the Termination Agreement is plain and unambiguous.
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nature of the agreement." Goff v. Cooper, 110 Ga. App. 339,343(1) (1964) (citation omitted)
(noting that "[0 ]nce this intent is clearly expressed by the parties we cannot read into the
agreement contrary inferences"); see also Eckerd Corp. v. Alterman Props., Ltd., 264 Ga. App.
72, 76(2) (2003) (noting the first step in the process to ascertain the parties' intent is to decide if
the contract language is unambiguous, and if so the court enforces the contract's clear terms).
"Although parol evidence as to the surrounding circumstances is admissible to explain
ambiguities and to aid in the construction of contracts, it is not admissible to contradict or
construe an unambiguous contract." Coleman, 294 Ga. App. at 249(2) (citations omitted).
"Parol evidence is inadmissible to add to, take from, or vary a written contract." O.C.G.A. § 132-2(1).

As noted above, the Termination Agreement is not ambiguous, and therefore the Court

will not consider extrinsic or parol evidence of intention and instead follows the intention of the
parties as unambiguously stated in the Termination Agreement.
As such, Defendant The Gidewons Property Holdings, Inc. 's Motion for Judgement on
the Pleadings is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this

___!t_ day of June, 2016.
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